


TECHNOLOGIECAMPUS GENT



Integrating Mobile Devices in Industrial Environments

Jan Vossaert Jan.Vossaert@cs.kuleuven.be MSEC

Veilige Industriële Netwerken UG 28/04/2016




Introduction

Is the security of mobile devices adequate to be used in ICS environments?

- This presentation:
 - Security features in mobile devices
 - Corporate security in mobile devices
- Next GC:
 - Integration with production environments
 - Cloud
 - Mobile devices in the OT network
 - Overview existing solutions



• Focus on Apps



Android and iOS

Android

- Huge diversity
 - Broad price/quality range
 - Many different Android versions
 - Android internals!
 - Software update policy

iOS

• Limited diversity



Android and iOS

Android

- Huge diversity
- OS provider = platform provider
 - Nexus range

iOS

- Limited diversity
- OS provider = platform provider
 - Security philosophy from HW to App framework



Android and iOS

Android

- Huge diversity
- OS provider ≠ platform provider
- Automated application verification

iOS

- Limited diversity
- OS provider = platform provider
- Strict/manual application vetting



Android and iOS Security

- Out-of-box security in Android and iOS better than in desktop systems
 - Stronger threat model

• Average iOS device security > Average Android device security

- Security generally increases every platform version
 - Visible security enhancements (permission system, HD encryption...)
 - Under the hood security enhancements (ASLR, SELinux, verified boot...)



Windows Phone

- Windows Phone is still quantité négligable
 - $_{\circ}$ In terms of available apps
 - $_{\circ}$ $\,$ In terms of market share
- Why choose the Windows Phone platform
 - Main focus is dedicated industrial apps, not consumer apps


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- Integration with Windows platform/management
- Development with .NET framework

Security in Mobile Platforms

- Secure/verified boot
- Secure storage
- System updates
- Application security
- Mobile devices in a corporate environment





- Bootloader
 - Software that starts when device boots
 - Responsible for starting Android
 - Locked: prevents flashing device with new ROMs
 - Unlocked: possible to flash custom ROMs
 - Unlocking capabilities depends on OEM
 - Samsung ships mostly unlockable
 - HTC supports official unlocking (voids warranty)
 - LG ships unlocked, but no default flashing support
 - Motorola tends to be locked tight (requires exploit)



- Bootloader
 - Software that starts when device boots
 - Responsible for starting Android
 - Locked: prevents flashing device with new ROMs
 - Unlocked: possible to flash custom ROMs
 - $_{\circ}$ Unlocking capabilities depends on OEM
 - Unlocking through OEM provided mechanisms wipes data
 - Privacy protection
 - Pre-full disk encryption era



Locked bootloader



<

verified boot




 Verified boot ensures the integrity of the device software starting from a hardware root of trust up to the system partition






- Locked bootloader
 < verified boot
- Verified boot ensures the integrity of the device software starting from a hardware root of trust up to the system partition
 - A public key is included on the boot partition, verified externally by the OEM
 - Used to verify the signature for that hash
 - Confirm the device's system partition is protected and unchanged
 - During boot, each stage verifies the integrity and authenticity of the next stage




- Locked bootloader < verified boot
- Verified boot ensures the integrity of the device software starting from a hardware root of trust up to the system partition
- Implemented in Nexus range, other vendors?...
 - Mandatory as of Android 6.0 (Android Compatibility Definition)



- Warn users of unexpected changes to the software
 - Protection for against malicious system software
 - If verification fails, the user is notified and given an option to continue using the device at their own discretion








ÉiOS

- Secure boot prevents booting custom ROMS (vs Android verified boot)
 - $_{\circ}$ Only software signed by Apple can boot
 - Bootloader
 - Kernel
 - Kernel extensions
 - Baseband firmware



Secure Storage

- Full disk encryption
 - Encryption key?



Key derivation function - KDF Key derivation function - KDF

Secure Storage

- Transparent to application (developer)
- Enabled by default (\clubsuit 5)
- Based on **dm-crypt** in Linux kernel







Secure Storage

- Key derivation
 - Four kinds of encryption states
 - Default, PIN, password, pattern
 - Hardware-backing protection against off-device attacks
 - Hardware-backed encryption is currently strongly recommended
 - Planned to change to *required* in next API version

Key derivation function - KDF



Key derivation function - KDF






MiOS


Secure Storage

- Full disk encryption
 - Semi-transparent to application developer
 - Data protection classes!
 - Hardware-backed protection against off-device attacks
- Key derived from password/PIN

Key derivation function - KDF



Key derivation function - KDF





System Updates

- Android update provisioning depends on three parties
 - Google (developer)
 - OEM (personalization phase 1)
 - Carrier (personalization phase 2)
- Short shelf-life of devices
 - Meaning short support/no updates by OEM/Carrier
 - Situation (very) slowly increasing with (some) OEMs
 - Nexus range gets updates from Google
- Resulting in millions of devices with known vulnerabilities



Version	Codename	API	Distribution
2.2	Froyo	8	0.1%
2.3.3 - 2.3.7	Gingerbread	10	2.6%
4.0.3 - 4.0.4	Ice Cream Sandwich	15	2.2%
4.1.x	Jelly Bean	16	7.8%
4.2.x		17	10.5%
4.3		18	3.0%
4.4	KitKat	19	33.4%
5.0	Lollipop	21	16.4%
5.1		22	19.4%
6.0	Marshmallow	23	4.6%

Data collected during a 7-day period ending on April 4, 2016. Any versions with less than 0.1% distribution are not shown.

ÉiOS

System Updates


• iOS update provisioning sole responsibility of Apple

- Long-term support (for mobile devices ⁽ⁱ⁾)
 - Depends on device



Application Security

- Every Android App
 - $_{\circ}$ Runs in its own process
 - $_{\circ}$ $\,$ Has its own ART VM instance
 - $_{\circ}~$ Is assigned a unique Linux user ID
 - $_{\odot}$ Uses Linux file permissions linked to that user ID








Application Security

- Access to low-level resources (network, phone calls, SMS, etc.) is enforced through user and group permissions at kernel level
- Higher level permissions restricted
 by the Android Runtime
- App developers need to specify the required permissions
- 6(+): users have the option of individually
 assigning permissions



- Your personal information read contact data, write contact data
- Services that cost you money send SMS messages
- Your messages edit SMS or MMS, read SMS or MMS, receive SMS
- Your location fine (GPS) location
- Network communication full Internet access
- Your accounts act as an account authenticator, manage the accounts list
- Storage modify/delete USB storage contents
- Phone calls read phone state and identity
- System tools prevent phone from sleeping, write sync settings



Application Security

- Application vetting
 - Manual procedure
 - Verification of access to device resources (capabilities)
 - User is requested for specific entitlements at runtime
 - Location service
 - Notifications
 - Entitlements can be revoked by the user



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<pre> Instellingen Privacy </pre>				
7	Locatievoorzieningen	Aan >		
	Contacten	>		
	Agenda's	>		
	Herinneringen	>		
*	Foto's	>		
*	Delen via Bluetooth	>		
U	Microfoon	>		
Ó	Camera	>		
	Gezondheid	>		
	HomeKit	>		
	Mediabibliotheek	>		
	Beweging en conditie	>		

Als apps om toegang vragen tot uw gegevens, worden ze aan bovenstaande categorieën toegevoegd.

• Secure remote access via VPN

• Mobile device management



- Android supports network security using VPN (IPSec)
 - Always-on VPN
 - $\circ~$ Per User VPN
 - Per Profile VPN
 - $_{\circ}$ $\,$ Per Application VPN $\,$

OpenVPN requires VPN application





- Android support Primary and Secondary users
- Primary user
 - The first user added to a device
 - Can't be removed, except by factory reset
 - Has special privileges and settings only set by that user
 - Always running even when other users are in the foreground

Secondary user

- Any user added to the device other than the Primary user
- $_{\circ}~$ Can be removed by their own doing and by the Primary user
- $_{\circ}$ Can't impact other users on a device



- Mobile device management
 - Device administration API
 4(+)

- $_{\odot}$ $\,$ Android for Work $\,$
 - 🗰 6
 - \clubsuit 4.0 5.1.1 for Work compatibility application
 - Especially suited for mixed-use devices



- Device administration API
 - Applications can request device admin privileges
 - Policy specification
 - These policies could be hard-coded into the app
 - Dynamically fetch policies from a third-party server



Activate device administrator? Sample Device Admin Additional text explaining why this needs to be added. Activating this administrator will allow the app API Demos to perform the following operations: Errore all data

- Erase all data Erase the tablet's data without warning, by performing a factory data reset
- Change the screen-unlock password Change the screen-unlock password
- Set password rules Control the length and the characters allowed in screen-unlock passwords
- Monitor screen-unlock attempts
 Monitor the number of incorrect passwords entered when unlocking the screen, and lock the tablet or erase all the tablet's data if too many incorrect passwords are entered
- Lock the screen
 Control how and when the screen locks
- Set lock-screen password expiration Control how frequently the lock-screen password must be changed
- Set storage encryption Require that stored application data be encrypted
- Disable cameras Prevent use of all device cameras

Cancel

Activate

- Device administration API
 - Applications can request device admin privileges
 - Policy specification
 - Policy enforcement
 - If a user fails to comply with the policies it is up to the application to decide how to handle this
 - If a device contains multiple enabled admin applications, the strictest policy is enforced
 - If denied, no application benefits



Activate device administrator? Sample Device Admin Additional text explaining why this needs to be added. Activating this administrator will allow the app API Demos to perform the following operations: Erase all data Erase the tablet's data without warning, by performing a factory data reset Change the screen-unlock password Change the screen-unlock password Set password rules Control the length and the characters allowed in screen-unlock passwords Monitor screen-unlock attempts Monitor the number of incorrect passwords entered when unlocking the screen, and lock the tablet or erase all the tablet's data if too many incorrect passwords are entered Lock the screen Control how and when the screen locks

- Set lock-screen password expiration Control how frequently the lock-screen password must be changed
- Set storage encryption Require that stored application data be encrypted
- Disable cameras Prevent use of all device cameras

Cancel

Activate

- Android for Work ($(\begin{subarray}{c} 6 \end{subarray})$
 - Program for supporting enterprise use of Android
 - Administrators control work profiles, which are kept separate from personal accounts, apps, and data
 - Allows organizations to manage the business data and applications they care about
 - Leave everything else on a device under the user's control



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
- Android for Work ((= 5.0+))
 - Program for supporting enterprise use of Android
 - Android for Work benefits:
 - **Data security**: Business data is separated in a work profile and protected device-wide on work-managed devices. IT can apply data leakage prevention policies
 - **Apps security**: Work apps are deployed through Google Play for Work. IT can prevent installation of apps from unknown sources and apply app configurations
 - **Device security**: Android for Work devices are protected with disk encryption, lockscreen, remote attestation services, and hardware-backed keystore when available



- Android for Work ((=5.0+))
 - Program for supporting enterprise use of Android
 - Delete your work profile in Settings > Accounts > Remove work profile
 - Removal of all apps and data within the work profile
 - Only the device policy controller application and the Android device owner can delete the work profile and data
 - Only the device owner can delete the personal data and perform a factory data reset
 - If a device is owned by your company or organization and configured with a device owner, the device owner can also perform a factory reset



- Enterprise mobility management (EMM) solution
 - o <u>https://www.google.com/work/android/partners</u>





ÉiOS

- iOS supports network security using VPN (IPSec)
 - \circ IPSec
 - OpenVPN
 - \circ Cisco IPSec
 - 0 ...
- Granularity
 - VPN on-demand
 - Per app VPN
 - $_{\circ}$ Always-on VPN



- Configuration profiles can be loaded on iOS devices
 - Passcode management
 - Minimum length
 - Maximum passcode age
 - Allow Touch ID
 - ...

. . .

- Device restrictions
 - Allow app installs
 - Allow iCloud backup
 - Allow in-app purchases

- Configuration management
 - Wi-Fi settings
 - VPN settings
 - Mail server settings
 - LDAP directory service settings
 - Credentials and keys
 - ...

Enroll devices with MDM server

- Mobile device management
 - Allows corporate resources and data to be managed in a way that is secure
 - Enforce settings, monitor corporate compliance, and remove corporate data and apps
 - Leave personal data and apps on each user's device intact





- Mobile device management
 - Managed apps
 - Can be removed remotely by an MDM server or when users remove their own devices from MDM
 - Removing the app also removes the data associated with the app





- Mobile device management
 - Managed apps
 - \circ Open In
 - Protects corporate data by controlling which apps and accounts are used to open documents and attachments.
 - Admins can configure a list of apps available in the sharing panel to keep work documents in corporate apps
 - Prevent personal documents from being opened in managed apps.
 - Also applies to third-party document providers and third-party keyboard apps





KU L

- Mobile device management
 - $_{\circ}$ Managed apps
 - \circ Open In
 - App configuration
 - App developers can identify app settings that can be enabled when installed as a managed app
 - These configuration settings can be installed before or after the managed app is installed

ÉiOS

- Mobile device management
 - $_{\circ}$ Managed apps
 - \circ Open In
 - App configuration
 - Prevent backup
 - Prevents managed apps from backing up data to iCloud or iTunes
 - Prevents managed app data from being recovered if the app is removed via MDM, but is later reinstalled by the user



Conclusion

- Future work
 - More information on mobile device management?
 - Existing applications/product for integrating mobile in ICS

- Other things related to this topic?
- Related projects
 - <u>www.msec.be/secureapps</u>
 - www.msec.be/crossmos